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Note
HERNANDEZ V. MESA: PRESERVING THE ZONE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AT THE BORDER
ALEXANDRA A. BOTSARIS
In Hernandez v. Mesa,1 the Court declined to address whether a Mexican citizen standing on Mexican soil was entitled to Fourth Amendment2 protections when fatally shot by a United States Border Patrol Agent standing
across the border in United States territory.3 This case exposes two critical
problems facing our southwest border—the use of excessive force by Border
Patrol agents and the lack of judicial remedy available to those subjected.
While the Supreme Court’s willingness to hear the issue reaffirms its importance, the Court has yet to provide significant guidance on how to apply
the Constitution extraterritorially to resolve these disputes. By remanding
the case back to the Fifth Circuit,4 the Court left the law at a standstill where
an immediate solution is necessary.
In Part I, this Note will provide a summary of the factual and procedural
circumstances leading to the Court’s opinion.5 Part II will explore the evolution of the extraterritorial doctrine in the context of constitutional application and will introduce the historical foundations of the Fourth Amendment.6
Part III will explain the reasoning behind the Court’s decision.7 Finally, in
Part IV, this Note will (1) present the context that gave rise to Agent Mesa’s
fatal shooting of Hernández and explain how Border Patrol agents operate
within an environment that fosters incidents of excessive force;8 (2) argue the
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1. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005–08.
4. Id. at 2006.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Section IV.A.
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Court should have extended Fourth Amendment protections by adopting the
functional approach established in Boumediene v. Bush9 to provide a civil
remedy to Hernández’s family and deter similar actions by Border Patrol
agents;10 and (3) contend that extending a remedy is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment’s historical purpose.11
I. THE CASE
On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernández Güereca (“Hernández”), a
fifteen-year-old Mexican boy, was playing a game with his friends in the
empty culvert that separates the United States and Mexico.12 This area of the
culvert is near the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry, an international port between
El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico.13 The boys would
run up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the United
States’ side of the border and then run back down into Mexico.14
During the game, United States Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr.
(“Agent Mesa”) arrived by bicycle and apprehended one of Hernández’s
friends.15 Hernández withdrew to the Mexican side of the border and hid
behind a pillar of the railroad bridge that reaches across the culvert.16 While
standing on American soil, Agent Mesa fired at least two shots across the
border toward Hernández—one of which hit Hernández in the face and killed
him.17 Agent Mesa, and the other United States Border Patrol Agents who
responded to the incident, eventually left the scene without providing aid to
Hernández.18 Hernández, who, according to the complaint, was “unarmed
and unthreatening” throughout the encounter,19 was pronounced dead after
Mexican authorities finally arrived.20

9. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
10. See infra Section IV.B. While there are other grounds for relief, this Note will solely focus
on the avenues available through the Fourth Amendment.
11. See infra Section IV.C.
12. Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated
sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); see Culvert, THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining the term as “[a] channel, conduit, or tunneled drain of masonry
or brick-work conveying a stream of water across beneath a canal, railway embankment, or road”).
13. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
14. Id. The border between the two countries runs through the middle of the culvert. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017).
15. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837; Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.
16. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
17. Id. at 837–38.
18. Id. at 838.
19. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.
20. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
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A. Preliminary Investigation & District Court Ruling
After the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declined to discipline Agent
Mesa,21 Hernández’s parents sued the United States, Agent Mesa, his supervisors, and unknown federal employees, alleging eleven claims against the
defendants.22 Claims One through Seven were brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)23 “based on multiple allegations of tortious conduct.”24 Claim Eight asserted the United States infringed upon Hernandez’s
Fourth25 and Fifth Amendment26 rights.27 Claim Nine contended the United
States “failed to adopt policies that would have prevented a violation of Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights.”28 Claim Ten purported
Agent Mesa was liable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics29 for using “excessive, deadly force” in violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.30 In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs
21. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigated the incident and concluded that Agent
Mesa “did not act inconsistently with [Customs and Border Patrol] policy or training regarding use
of force,” and “there was insufficient evidence” to accuse Agent Mesa of a federal civil rights violation. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2005 (quoting Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Federal Officials Close Investigation into the Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca (Apr. 27,
2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-death-sergio-hernandez-guereca). Specifically, the DOJ found that the incident “occurred while smugglers attempting
an illegal border crossing hurled rocks from close range at a [Customs and Border Patrol] agent who
was attempting to detain a suspect.” Id. (same). The DOJ noted, “Hernández ‘was neither within
the borders of the United States nor present on U.S. property, as required for jurisdiction to exist
under the applicable federal civil rights statute.’” Id. (same).
22. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838. In this Section, Jesus C. Hernández and Maria Guadalupe Guereca Bentacour, the parents of the victim, will be collectively referred to as “the plaintiffs.”
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012). The court stated:
The FTCA allows a person to sue the United States for the negligence or other tortious conduct of
its employees acting within the scope of employment in situations where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
tort occurred.
Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West 2011)).
24. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015); see Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (listing the specific FTCA claims
brought by the plaintiffs).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment establishes, “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated.” Id. (emphasis added).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides, “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life [or] liberty . . . without due process of law.” Id. (emphasis added).
27. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
28. Id.
29. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
30. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015). Under Bivens, an individual may bring a cause of action against “a federal
agent for money damages when the federal agent has allegedly violated that person’s constitutional
rights.” Id. at 272 (quoting Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 622 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006));
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added Agent Mesa’s supervisors to the Bivens action, claiming they too violated Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.31 Lastly, Claim
Eleven was grounded in the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),32 claiming Hernández’s death was a violation of “international treaties, conventions and the
Laws of Nations.”33
The United States moved to dismiss Claims One through Nine and
Claim Eleven for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the plaintiffs’
failure to establish the facts necessary to warrant relief.34 The district court
ultimately granted the United States’ motion, which removed the United
States from the case.35 Regarding the plaintiff’s FTCA claims, the district
court found the FTCA’s foreign country exception, which grants “immunity
[to] Government employees against liability from torts arising in a foreign
country,”36 applied since Hernández was injured in Mexico.37 Accordingly,
the district court dismissed Claims One through Seven.38 Based on similar
reasoning, the court also dismissed Claim Eight and Nine because “the
United States ha[d] not waived its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts
under the FTCA.”39 In addressing the plaintiff’s ATS claims, the court found
the statutory language of the ATS40 and the language of the treaties “form the

see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (explaining when “an excessive force claim arises
in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop . . . it is most properly characterized as one invoking
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees . . . the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person”).
31. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The ATS grants United States district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.” Id.
33. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 255 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
34. Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837, 838–39 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015),
vacated sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017); see id. at 389 (setting out the Government’s argument).
35. Id. at 837.
36. Id. at 841 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(k) (West 2011)). The central focus of the inquiry is
on the location in which the injury was suffered, not the location in which the tortious act occurred.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (holding that “the FTCA’s foreign country
exception bars all claims based on an injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the
tortious act or omission occurred”).
37. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 569 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010)).
40. See supra note 32 (providing the exact language of the ATS).
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substantive basis” for the claim but did not contain an “unequivocally expressed” waiver of sovereign immunity.41 Consequently, the court dismissed
Claim Eleven.42
Following the United States’ successful motion, Agent Mesa moved to
dismiss the Bivens claim against him based on qualified immunity.43 Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability unless the officer violated a
constitutional right that was “clearly established at the time of the [officer’s]
alleged misconduct.”44 In granting the motion, the court reasoned no clearly
established constitutional right existed because Hernández did not have the
sufficient voluntary connections to the United States required under United
States v. Verdugo–Uquidez45 to invoke Fourth Amendment protections.46
Furthermore, the court explained Graham v. Connor47 negated the Fifth
Amendment claim because it held, “[E]xcessive force claims should be analyzed only under the Fourth Amendment.”48 Similarly, Agent Mesa’s supervisors moved to dismiss all claims brought against them.49 The district court
granted the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff’s “failed to show ‘the Defendants were personally involved in the June 7 incident’ or there was a causal
link ‘between the Defendants’ acts or omissions and a violation of Hernández’s rights.”50
B. Review by The Fifth Circuit
The plaintiffs appealed the adverse judgments to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.51 In its initial opinion, the Fifth Circuit af-

41. Hernandez, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 845. For liability to “be imposed upon the United States,”
Congress must have (1) “unequivocally expressed in statutory text” the intent to waive sovereign
immunity, and “(2) there must be a source of substantive law that provides a claim for relief.” Id.
at 840 (first quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. 468 F.3d 248, 260 (5th Cir. 2006) (Dennis,
J., concurring); then quoting Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 334–35 (5th Cir. 2009); and
then quoting In re Supreme Beef Processors, 468 F.3d at 260)).
42. Id.
43. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015).
44. Id. at 260 (quoting Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2013)).
45. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
46. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256.
47. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
48. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 256.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 257.
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firmed the judgment in favor of the United States and Agent Mesa’s supervisors.52 Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment53 but ultimately reversed the
judgment in favor of Agent Mesa on Fifth Amendment grounds.54 The court
held that the appellants,55 by defeating qualified immunity, alleged a viable
Fifth Amendment Bivens action against Agent Mesa.56
The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc to consider whether Agent
Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and, necessarily, whether Hernández was protected by the Fifth Amendment.57 The en banc court unanimously
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claim.58 The court reasoned the
Fifth Amendment right against excessive force claimed by the appellants on
behalf of Hernández was not a “clearly established” right “at the time of [the]
alleged misconduct,” which is a necessary prong in the qualified immunity
analysis.59 Specifically, the case law at the time of the shooting did not “reasonably warn[] Agent Mesa”60 that a non-citizen, with no significant voluntary connections to the United States standing on foreign soil, was protected
against the use of excessive force by a United States official standing within
United States territory.61 The en banc court, therefore, successfully escaped
the constitutional question—that is, the applicability of the Fifth Amendment
to Hernández—in accordance with “the general rule of constitutional avoidance.”62
52. Id. at 280.
53. Id. at 267.
54. Id. at 280.
55. In the discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s holding, Jesus C. Hernández and Maria Guadalupe
Guereca Bentacour, the victim’s parents and the plaintiffs below, will now be collectively referred
to as “the appellants.”
56. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 280.
57. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119–20 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc), vacated sub
nom. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). The en banc court agreed with the panel court’s
decision to affirm “the dismissal of . . . claims against the United States and against Agent Mesa’s
supervisors.” Id. at 119 (citation omitted) (citing Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 257–59, 280). Additionally, the court concurred in the panel court’s holding that “Hernández, a Mexican citizen who had
no ‘significant voluntary connection’ to the United States, and who was on Mexican soil at the time
he was shot, cannot assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)). Therefore, the en banc court only
considered the issue of qualified immunity and, accordingly, the application of the Fifth Amendment to Hernández. Id. at 119–20.
58. Id. at 119.
59. Id. at 120, 121 (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232
(2009)).
60. Under this analysis, “a right is clearly established only where ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id. at 120 (quoting
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 121 (quoting Callahan, 555 U.S. at 241); see Constitutional-Avoidance Rule,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the rule of constitutional avoidance as “[t]he
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On July 23, 2015, the appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States to review the Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision, and the Court
granted certiorari.63 Three questions were presented for review: (1) whether
the appellants can assert a Bivens claim for damages; (2) whether Hernández’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Agent Mesa fatally shot
him; and (3) whether qualified immunity can protect Agent Mesa from the
appellant’s claim that Hernández’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated
when Agent Mesa fatally shot him.64
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The debate surrounding the extraterritorial application of the Constitution has deep historical roots.65 Traditionally, the Supreme Court maintained
a strictly formalist approach,66 halting constitutional protections at the border.67 As time progressed, however, the Court became more favorable to
functionalist considerations but has yet to overrule its formalist precedent.68
The law is accordingly in a variable state, leaving lower courts free to choose
their own route when considering the extraterritoriality of constitutional privileges. The following sections will elaborate on the history of this judicial
trend by (1) discussing the Court’s early attempts at drawing this line,69 (2)
highlighting the major points of transition in the extraterritorial doctrine,70
and (3) summarizing the modern interpretation.71 Subsequent to this discussion, this Part will provide a brief introduction to the historical foundations
of the Fourth Amendment.72

doctrine that a case should not be resolved by deciding a constitutional question if it can be resolved
in some other fashion”).
63. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (No. 15-118), 2015 WL 4537883.
64. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2004–05.
65. See generally In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (discussing, for the first time, the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution).
66. See Formalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining formalism as
“[d]ecision-making on the basis of form rather than substance; . . . an interpretive method whereby
the judge adheres to the words rather than pursuing the text’s unexpressed purposes . . . or evaluating its consequences”).
67. See infra Section II.A.
68. See infra Section II.B–C; Functionalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining functionalism as “[a] methodological approach to law focusing on the effects of rules in practice . . . rather than on the precise statements of the rules themselves”).
69. See infra Section II.A.
70. See infra Section II.B.
71. See infra Section II.C.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see infra Section II.D.
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A. Early Developments: Defining the Limits of Constitutional
Protection
In 1891, the Court first considered the reach of the Constitution abroad
in In re Ross.73 John M. Ross, a Canadian crew-member on an American
ship anchored in a Japanese harbor, was sentenced to death by the American
Consular Tribunal in Japan for the murder of a fellow seaman.74 In seeking
a writ of habeas corpus, Ross argued his presence on an American ship and
trial by an American tribunal should have entitled him to the “same protection
and guarantee against an undue accusation or an unfair trial, secured by the
Constitution.”75 The Court held the rights Ross sought, such as the right to
an impartial trial by jury and to an indictment by a grand jury, were only
available to United States citizens and those within the nation’s borders, “not
to residents or temporary sojourners abroad.”76 Accordingly, persons upon
an American vessel were not entitled to the protections of the Constitution
until they entered United States territory.77 Ultimately, the Court adopted a
strictly formalist approach and concluded the Constitution has no effect outside the bounds of the United States.78
From 1901 to 1922, the Court considered whether the Constitution extended to United States territories in a series of cases known collectively as
the Insular Cases.79 Through these decisions, the Court developed the doctrine of territorial incorporation,80 which provides that the Constitution applies with full force in territories that Congress intended to “incorporate” as
part of the United States.81 The Court’s decisions were also motivated by the
73. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
74. Id. at 454. President Hayes pardoned Ross on the condition that he receive a life sentence
of hard labor. Id. at 455.
75. Id. at 463.
76. Id. at 464 (citing Cook v United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S.
176 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mendezona v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905);
Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Kent
v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Ocampo
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
80. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (explaining the doctrine of territorial
incorporation).
81. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305–06. The territories included in this doctrine were also classified
as “[t]erritories surely destined for statehood.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757.
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practical obstacles involved in extending the Constitution outside the continental United States, recognizing constitutional provisions “are not always
and everywhere applicable” and demonstrating an initial interest in functionalist thinking.82
The Court was silent on the issue of extraterritoriality until 1950 when
it heard Johnson v. Eisentrager.83 In Johnson, twenty-one German nationals
petitioned for writs of habeas corpus after being tried and convicted for war
crimes by a United States military commission in China.84 The prisoners
claimed their trial by military commission and subsequent convictions violated Article I, Article III, and the Fifth Amendment.85 The Court held the
Constitution does not protect alien prisoners tried and detained abroad.86 In
recognizing constitutional protections extend to resident aliens, the Court explained, “[I]t was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that
gave the Judiciary power to act.”87 Accordingly, the prisoners in this case
had no grounds to base their constitutional claim since they “at no relevant
time were within any territory over which the United States [was] sovereign.”88 In addition, similar to the Insular Cases, the Court exhibited receptiveness to functionalism when it considered several practical complications
inherent in extending the right of the writ to the prisoners abroad.89
In his dissent, Justice Black focused his analysis on the functionalist
approach to extraterritoriality.90 He cautioned that the majority’s territorial
approach was “a broad and dangerous principle” as it “inescapably denie[d]
courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject
to our occupation government abroad.”91 Justice Black continued to consider
a number of functional factors to explain why the Constitution, and specifically habeas corpus review, should have extended to “[the] petitioners and

82. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
83. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
84. Id. at 765–66. Specifically, the prisoners were “collecting and furnishing intelligence concerning American forces and their movements to the Japanese armed forces” and, thereby, were
found guilty of “engaging in, permitting or ordering continued military activity against the United
States after surrender of Germany and before surrender of Japan.” Id. at 766.
85. Id. at 767. While not relevant to this discussion, the prisoners also claimed that their trial,
conviction, and subsequent imprisonment violated “provisions of the Geneva Convention governing
treatment of prisoners of war.” Id.
86. Id. at 785.
87. Id. at 771.
88. Id. at 778.
89. Id. at 779; see, e.g., id. (explaining that the practical complications would include the costs
of transportation of petitioners and witnesses, the implication that this would make the writ available
to enemies in times of war, which would “hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the
enemy,” and the lack of potential reciprocity).
90. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 795–96.

2018]

HERNANDEZ V. MESA

841

others like them.”92 Justice Black concluded, “Our nation proclaims a belief
in the dignity of human beings as such, no matter what their nationality or
where they happen to live.”93 Moving into the late 1950s, the question of
extraterritoriality hinged on the geographic location of those wishing to invoke constitutional protections.
B. The Transition: The Constitution Moves Overseas
In 1957, the Court decided Reid v. Covert,94 a case involving two military wives who were tried in a United States military court overseas for murdering their husbands.95 Both women sought a writ of habeas corpus “on the
ground that the Constitution forbade [the] trial [of civilians abroad] by military authorities.”96 The Court agreed, holding, on the basis of Section 2 of
Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment, that their trial
was unconstitutional.97 The Court reasoned, when the United States government “reache[d] out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the
Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide . . . should not be
stripped away just because he happen[ed] to be in another land.”98 Constitutional protections, the Court said, not only extend to citizens abroad, but the
constitutional restraints placed upon government actors similarly follow
those officials as they perform their duties outside the territory of the United
States.99 With this holding, the Court effectively overruled In re Ross and
moved even further away from the strict formalism it adopted.100
Notably, Justice Harlan’s concurrence exemplifies the modern functionalist approach. He argued, “[T]here is no rigid and abstract rule.”101 Instead,
when considering the extraterritoriality of the Constitution, the question
should be “which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of the

92. Id. at 797; see, e.g., id. at 797–98 (considering the control the United States has over that
occupied area of Germany, that United States laws were applied, the unlikelihood that these prisoners would receive relief elsewhere, and the general constitutional principle that “all people, whether
our citizens or not . . . have an equal chance before the bar of criminal justice”).
93. Id. at 798.
94. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
95. Id. at 3–4.
96. Id. at 4.
97. Id. at 5, 7–8.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id. at 12. The Court explained, “The Ross approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad has long since been directly repudiated by numerous cases” and “should be left as a
relic from a different era.” Id.
101. Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives.”102 The Court, Justice Harlan explained, should be free to use its judgment, as opposed to strict adherence to a set rule, to avoid “impracticable and
anomalous” results.103 Accordingly, as of 1957, the Constitution followed
both United States citizens and officials abroad, providing all the same protections and restrictions as it would if they were standing within United States
territory.104
C. The Modern Approach: Functionalism or Formalism?
The case law surrounding the extraterritoriality of the Constitution remained undisturbed until 1990, when the Court decided United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez.105 Rene Martin Verdugo–Urquidez, a Mexican citizen arrested and convicted for his leadership role in “a large and violent
organization in Mexico that smuggles narcotics into the United States,”
moved to dismiss his case on the basis that the warrantless search of his home
in Mexico by United States agents violated the Fourth Amendment.106 The
Court disagreed,107 reasoning the protections against arbitrary government
embedded in the Fourth Amendment extended only to “the people” of the
United States and were not “intended to restrain the actions of the Federal
Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”108 Looking
to precedent, the Court concluded, “[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial [voluntary] connections with this country.”109 The Court
ultimately held Verdugo–Urquidez did not meet this requirement.110 The
Court emphasized its formalist approach by concluding strict limits to constitutional application at the border are necessary to ensure the nation’s ability to “functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.”111
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy objected to the majority’s reliance
on the language of the Fourth Amendment to determine its scope,112 but he
102. Id. at 75 (emphasis omitted).
103. Id. at 74.
104. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
105. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
106. Id. at 262–63.
107. Id. at 275.
108. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 271.
110. Id. at 271–72. The Court explained that Verdugo–Urquidez’s presence within the United
States was involuntary, as he was forcibly brought into the country by United States officials, and
he had been present in the country for only a few days. Id.
111. Id. at 275 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958)).
112. Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explains, “The force of the Constitution is not confined because it was brought into being by certain persons who gave their immediate
assent to its terms.” Id.
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agreed with the Court’s holding because “[t]he conditions and considerations
of this case would make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous.”113 Justice Brennan, however, in
his dissent, argued the majority “create[d] an antilogy,” as the Constitution
permits “our Government [officials] to enforce our criminal laws abroad”
but, per the Court’s holding, did not require the Fourth Amendment to “travel
with them.”114 The United States considers itself to be “the world’s foremost
protector of liberties,” Justice Brennan proclaimed, but he continued to ask,
“How can we explain to others—and to ourselves—that these long cherished
ideals are suddenly of no consequence when the door being broken belongs
to a foreigner?”115
In Boumediene v. Bush,116 the Court’s most recent decision on extraterritoriality, the Court held, by applying the functionalist approach, aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to the constitutional right of habeas
corpus.117 The Court explained, there is a “common thread” between its precedent cases118—“the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective
factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”119 The Court identified three
relevant factors to consider: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.”120 After considering each factor, the Court concluded
the detainees were “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the
legality of their detention.”121 Evidently, this decision declined to follow the
formalist precedent and relied primarily on functionalist thinking.122 The
Court, however, did not explicitly overrule the formalist approach used in its
prior precedent.123 Moving forward, the Court left open two routes to the
extraterritorial analysis based on opposing theories of legal interpretation.
113. Id. at 276, 278.
114. Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 285–86.
116. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
117. Id. at 732.
118. Id. at 764 (citing the Insular Cases, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), and Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 766.
121. Id. at 771. The Court based its decision on (1) the inadequacy of the review process to
determine the status of the detainees/enemy combatants, (2) the United States’ “[non-]transient” and
complete control over Guantanamo Bay, and (3) the minimal burdens, balanced with the United
States’ inability to provide evidence to the contrary, involved in extending the writ in these circumstances. Id. at 766–71.
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
123. See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 265, 266 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining how
the court is “bound to apply the sufficient connections requirement of Verdugo–Urquidez . . . in
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D. The Fourth Amendment: Overview of the Historical Foundations
To provide context to the forthcoming analysis, this Section will briefly
summarize the historical basis of the Fourth Amendment through a discussion of one of the Court’s early founding precedents, Boyd v. United States.124
In Boyd, the United States seized thirty-five cases of imported plated glass
from Boyd & Sons on the grounds that the owners had committed fraud in
violation of an 1874 customs revenue law.125 As provided by the statute, the
company was ordered to furnish the invoice for the seized cases to establish
the basis for the charge.126 The company complied but objected to the use of
the invoice as evidence, claiming, “[T]he statute, so far as it compel[ed] production of evidence to be used against [the company] [was] unconstitutional
and void” based on the Fourth Amendment.127 After recognizing this case
presented “a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal
security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen,”128 the Court found,
“[A] compulsory production of a man’s private papers to establish a criminal
charge against him . . . is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment . . . because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of
search and seizure.”129 The Court held the notice requiring Boyd & Sons to
produce the invoice and the law that legitimized it was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.130
To support its conclusion, the Court relied on the historical foundations
of the Fourth Amendment.131 The Court summarized the rejection of the
early English writs of assistance132 and general warrants133 as an abuse of

light of Boumediene’s general functional approach” because the court “cannot ignore a decision
from the Supreme Court unless directed to do so by the Court itself”), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117
(5th Cir. 2015).
124. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
125. Id. at 617.
126. Id. at 618.
127. Id. at 618, 621. In addition to the Fourth Amendment, Boyd & Sons also based their claim
on the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 621. While intertwined with the Court’s analysis of the Fourth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment argument will not be discussed.
128. Id. at 618.
129. Id. at 622.
130. Id. at 638.
131. Id. at 624–25.
132. Writs of assistance were issued to “revenue officers” and allowed them to “search suspected places for smuggled goods.” Id. at 625.
133. General warrants were issued by the Secretary of State and allowed officials to search one’s
home for the “discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner
of the charge of libel.” Id. at 625–26.
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arbitrary power and hindrance to liberty by the Crown that fueled this nation’s movement toward independence.134 The Court contended it was with
this backdrop—“[t]he struggles against arbitrary power . . . [that were] too
deeply engraved in their memories”—that the Framers crafted the Fourth
Amendment.135 In accordance with this historical framework, the Court further noted, the “essence” of a Fourth Amendment violation revolved less
around “the breaking of [one’s] doors, and the rummaging of [one’s] drawers,” but instead focused on “the invasion of [one’s] indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty.”136 The Framers, accordingly, “never would
have approved . . . such insidious disguises of the old grievance which they
had so deeply abhorred.”137
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s ruling
and remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration.138
The Court first addressed whether the appellants may assert a Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics139 claim for damages and held it would be more “appropriate” for the Court of Appeals to
reconsider the issue in light of the Court’s recent decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi.140 In Abbasi, the Court “clarified what constitutes a ‘special factor
counseling hesitation,’” which is a necessary consideration when deciding
whether to extend a Bivens remedy to a situation beyond the pre-established
types of factual circumstances that provide the basis for a cause of action.141
Specifically, under Abbasi, the special factors analysis focuses on the Judici-

134. Id. at 625; see id. at 626–30 (praising Lord Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington
(1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) (20.3.1), as “the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law”
that informed the Framers as they drafted the Fourth Amendment).
135. Id. at 630.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2008 (2017). On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the ruling of the district court, holding there are special factors counseling hesitation against extending a Bivens remedy in this new context. Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 12-50217, slip op. at 18–19 (5th
Cir. Mar. 20, 2018). The court reasoned, “extending Bivens would interfere with the political
branches’ oversight of national security and foreign affairs[,] . . . flout Congress’s consistent and
explicit refusal to provide damages remedies for aliens injured abroad[,] [a]nd . . . create a remedy
with uncertain limits.” Id. at 18. The court furthered noted, “The myriad implications of an extraterritorial Bivens remedy require this court to deny it.” Id. at 19.
139. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
140. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006–07.
141. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2006 (alteration omitted). Bivens does not apply when “there are
‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’” Id. (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
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ary’s ability, “absent congressional action or instruction,” to assess the consequences of moving forward with a new category of action for damages.142
In support of its decision to remand the issue, the Court ended this analysis
by recognizing its role as a reviewing court, not a court of first impression.143
Next, the Court addressed the Fourth Amendment issue within the context of the Bivens claim.144 The Court held, “It would be imprudent for this
Court to resolve that issue” considering the “intervening guidance provided
in Abbasi,” which may ultimately eliminate the Fourth Amendment issue as
the presence of special factors counseling hesitation may prevent a Bivens
remedy from emerging within the context of the instant case.145 In support
of avoiding the constitutional question, the Court further reasoned, without
enumerating specific examples, that the Fourth Amendment inquiry is “sensitive and may have consequences that are far reaching.”146
Finally, considering the Fifth Amendment147 claim, the Court held, “The
en banc Court of Appeals . . . erred in granting qualified immunity” because
the court relied on facts that were unknown to Agent Mesa at the time of the
shooting.148 Specifically, Agent Mesa did not know Hernández was a Mexican citizen with no significant voluntary connection to the United States
when he shot him.149 In the context of determining whether a right is clearly
established,150 the Court explained the inquiry “is limited to ‘the facts that
were knowable to the defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in the conduct in question.”151 The Court, accordingly, concluded, “Facts an officer
learns after the incident . . . are not relevant” in determining whether qualified immunity should be granted or denied.152 The Court remanded the case
to the Fifth Circuit to reconsider the issue.153

142. Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858).
143. Id. at 2007 (quoting Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151
(2017)).
144. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
145. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007. If special factors counseling hesitation, in light of the
Court’s clarification in Abbasi, prevent a Bivens remedy in the situation presented here, no need
exists to consider the constitutional element of the Bivens action (i.e., the Fourth Amendment question) because the entire Bivens claim will have deteriorated. Id.
146. Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
148. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 44, 62 and accompanying text.
151. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007 (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per
curiam)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2006.
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Justice Breyer, in his dissent, wrote on the Fourth Amendment issue the
majority failed to address.154 Specifically, Justice Breyer would have reversed the lower court’s judgment that Hernández lacked significant voluntary connections to the United States to invoke Fourth Amendment protections.155 Accordingly, under Justice Breyer’s approach, “reversal would
ordinarily bring with it the right” to allege a Bivens claim for damages.156
Justice Breyer explained, the Court’s “precedents make clear that ‘questions
of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism’” or de jure sovereignty.157 Justice Breyer proceeded to list six factors and concerns which “convince[d] [him] that Hernández was protected by
the Fourth Amendment.”158
First, Agent Mesa was a federal officer who did not know the citizenship
of the boy he was targeting nor whether the bullet would land on the Mexican
or United States side of the border.159 Second, the culvert, where the shooting
took place, “has special border-related physical features” as “fences and border crossing posts are not in the culvert itself [where the borderline actually
resides] but lie on either side.”160 Third, the culvert has historically been the
nontechnical border, as it was built to relocate the Rio Grande River—the
original border between Mexico and the United States.161 Fourth, the culvert
was constructed and is now managed by a “jointly organized international
boundary commission” that contains “representatives of both nations.”162
Fifth, the culvert, as a “limitrophe” area,163 imposes “special obligation[s] of
co-operation and good neighborliness” upon bordering nations as prescribed
by international law.164 Sixth, if the Fourth Amendment is not extended to
the culvert, “serious anomalies” will result.165 Justice Breyer expounded:

154. Id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2008–09 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008)). De jure sovereignty refers to sovereignty that “[e]xist[s] by right or according to law.” De jure, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
158. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2009–10.
163. Id. Limitrophe describes “a special border-related area” that “consist[s] of an engineer’s
‘imaginary line’” as opposed to a traditional border created by “rivers, mountain ranges, and other
[physical] areas.” Id.
164. Id. at 2010; see, e.g., id. at 2009–10 (discussing the joint responsibilities of the limitrophe
as proscribed by the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande
and Colorado River as the International Boundary, Mex.-U.S., art. II-IV, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
371).
165. Id. at 2010.

848

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:832

The Court of Appeals’ approach create[d] a protective difference
depending upon whether Hernández had been hit just before or just
after he crossed an imaginary mathematical borderline running
through the culvert’s middle. But nothing else would have
changed . . . [g]iven the near irrelevance of that midculvert line (as
compared with the rest of the culvert) for most border-related purposes, as well as almost any other purpose, that result would seem
anomalous.166
A consideration of these factors as a whole, Justice Breyer concluded,
establishes sufficient support for extending Fourth Amendment protections
to the entire culvert.167 Accordingly, Justice Breyer would have addressed
the Fourth Amendment question and remanded the Bivens and qualified immunity issues.168
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part will begin by introducing the context in which Hernández lost
his life, explaining how Border Patrol agents operate under conditions that
encourage the use of excessive force.169 Next, this Part will argue the Court
should have allowed a civil remedy—an immediate form of deterrence to
curb the future use of excessive force—by holding the Fourth Amendment
can apply in this case through the Boumediene v. Bush170 objective factors
analysis, which this Part will argue fundamentally overrules the significant
voluntary connections test established in United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez.171 Lastly, this Part will contend providing a remedy is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment’s historical objectives.172
A. Contributing Circumstances
The combination of internal obstacles with the lack of external accountability has created conditions that breed excessive force incidents,173 like the
166. Id. Justice Breyer added, “[T]he anomalies would multiply” as there are “[n]umerous
bridges span[ning] the culvert” that are used daily by Mexicans and Americans. Id. Therefore, he
concluded, it does not seem practical or logical “to distinguish for Fourth Amendment purposes
among these many thousands of individuals on the basis of an invisible line of which none of them
is aware.” Id. at 2011.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See infra Section IV.A.
170. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
171. 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see infra Section IV.B.
172. See infra Section IV.C.
173. From January 2010 to May 2016, out of the fifty-three deaths caused by Border Patrol
agents, forty-eight were attributed to the “use of force or coercion.” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF
N.M., DEATHS AND INJURIES IN CBP ENCOUNTERS SINCE JANUARY 2010, at 24 (2016),
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one in the present case, and foster minimal mechanisms of deterrence.174 Access to a civil remedy could provide an incentive for Border Patrol agents to
limit their abusive use of force and ensure the 500,000 individuals that cross
the border daily,175 those most vulnerable to such mistreatment, have access
to potential recourse if so subjected. This Section will summarize the internal
and external factors contributing to the present state of Border Patrol.
There are a number of significant internal factors, when combined, that
provide the basis for excessive use of force by Border Patrol agents. First,
the Agency has become increasingly militarized despite being a civilian
force.176 Many agents are recent veterans who served in Afghanistan and
Iraq,177 and there have been upgrades to military quality surveillance and defense equipment.178 Relatedly, agents “consider themselves the country’s
first line of defense, . . . vowing to ‘never surrender a foot of U.S. soil.’”179
This mentality is reinforced by the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”). The DHS explicitly instructs agents to “fight back” against criminal organizations that operate around the border, which implicitly encourages
the mentality that everyone near the border is a “bad guy” and mirrors the
state of mind held by soldiers on the battlefield where deadly force is a means
of survival.180 Furthermore, Border Patrol agents are also granted significantly greater powers than traditional law enforcement officers.181 For example, agents may conduct searches without reasonable suspicion, probable
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/may_2016_dead_and_injured_by_cbp_officials.pdf.
174. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency in
Support of Petitioners at 3, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter
Brief by Former Officials of CBP].
175. Brief of Amici Curiae Border Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 4, Hernandez v. Mesa,
137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter Brief by Border Scholars] (citing TransBorder
Freight Data, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/TBDR_BCQ.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2018)).
176. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 3.
177. Id. at 6 (noting “more than one-third of Border Patrol agents are former military personnel”). While not inherently negative, the high number of former service men and women, nonetheless, contributes to the militarized environment of Border Patrol. Id at 5–6.
178. Id. Examples include Blackhawk helicopters, fixed-winged jets, and predator drones. Id.
(citing Todd Miller, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-border.html).
179. Id. at 7 (quoting Mark Binelli, 10 Shots Across the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/magazine/10-shots-across-the-border.html).
180. Id. It is noteworthy to acknowledge that many policymakers are in support of a stronger
force at the border. See, e.g., Press Release, More Praises for President Trump’s Commitment to
Border Security, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 23 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/praise-president-trumps-commitment-border-security/ (summarizing a number of favorable
responses to increased border security). The author, however, does not intend to argue a particular
policy stance on border security but only attempts to illustrate the current trends that have contributed to excessive force incidents.
181. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 5–6.
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cause, or a warrant if the target of their search is within 100 feet of the border.182
Second, training on appropriate use of force for Border Patrol agents is
lacking, which is demonstrated by the numerous reports filed claiming excessive use of force and by the multitude of deaths caused by Border Patrol
agents.183 This is likely the result of the low supervision rates of trainees due
to insufficient funds caused by the “hiring surge.”184 Specifically, an audit
of the use of force training programs revealed, at one location, “many agents
and officers do not understand use of force and the extent to which they may
or may not use force.”185 The most frequent example of lack of training arises
in incidents involving rock throwing.186 Rock throwing, a common occurrence at the border, is considered to be a lethal threat and agents have developed an “unofficial” policy of responding with the use of deadly force “instead of taking cover or calling for backup.”187 Agents routinely remained in
reach of the rock throwers despite the fact that “moving out of range was a
reasonable option.”188
Third, pre-employment screening measures are deficient, which is similarly a likely result of limited resources combined with the “rapid” increase
of new hires.189 From 2006 to 2009, only 10 to 15 percent of new agents

182. Id. at 6–7 (citing Lori Johnson, Preserving the Excessive Force Doctrine at Our Nation’s
Borders, 14 HOLY CROSS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 90 (2010)).
183. From 2007 to 2012, there have been 1187 reports of use of excessive force by agents. Id.
at 18 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., CBP USE OF FORCE
TRAINING AND ACTIONS TO ADDRESS USE OF FORCE INCIDENTS 6–7 (Sept. 2013) (redacted),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2013/OIG_13-114_Sep13.pdf); see supra note 173.
184. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 12, 15 (explaining “resource constraints” left CPB “unable to match [the] hiring surge with adequate . . . training programs” and the
agent-to-supervisor ration range from 7-1 and up to 11-1). The lack of funds for agent training can
be further demonstrated through current fund allocation trends. Based solely on an assessment of
CBP’s current funding priorities, the 2019 budget report allocates over three times the amount of
funding to wall construction, infrastructure development, and equipment upgrades than to training
initiatives. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 2–3 (2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20BIB%202019.pdf.
185. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 183, at 17.
186. For ten out of the twenty-four incidents of fatal shootings from 2010 to 2014, rock throwing
was given as justification for the use of force. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174,
at 9 (citing Brian Bennett, Border Patrol Sees Little Reform on Agents’ Use of Force, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-abuse-20150223-story.html).
187. Id. Furthermore, agents have used lethal force even when inside their vehicles despite Border Patrol’s policy to use lethal force only when reasonably necessary. Id. at 10.
188. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, USE OF
FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES 6 (2013), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PERFReport.pdf.
189. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 12, 14.
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received pre-employment polygraphs despite the “border region [being] considered the ‘highest threat environment for government corruption.’”190 The
results of the administered polygraphs indicated “60 percent [of applicants]
were determined unsuitable for service . . . because they admitted . . . to prior
criminal activity, including violent crimes and involvement with drug cartels
and smugglers.”191 Despite these results, Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”) did not require pre-employment polygraph examinations for all applicants until 2012.192 In fact, cartel members have been hired, there have
been instances of infiltration, and current agents have been arrested for serious crimes (e.g., smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy) and other
lesser offences (e.g., drunk driving, domestic violence, and assault).193
Lastly, Border Patrol agents practice a “culture of protectionism” that
hinders internal investigations of claims involving excessive force.194 Agents
have developed a “code of silence”—an understanding between agents that
nothing is to be said that may incriminate another agent, even if they have
clearly violated the law.195 Their motto is: “What happens in the field stays
in the field.”196
These internal hurdles that have contributed to unregulated action are
heightened when combined with the external obstacles limiting accountability. First, the United States has never extradited an agent to Mexico to be
prosecuted for the use of lethal force on a Mexican citizen.197 The United
States has no obligation to extradite its own citizens under the relevant
treaty,198 and it is highly unlikely it would do so voluntarily.199 Second, only
one agent has ever been charged in the United States for a cross-border shooting.200 The obstacles facing internal investigation and the preference against
190. Id. at 13 (quoting Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became
America’s Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2014,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/10/border-patrol-the-green-monster-112220).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 14.
193. Id. at 16–18; see, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Hired by Customs, but Working for Mexican
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/18corrupt.html
(providing instances where CBP employees facilitated smuggling activity).
194. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 4.
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id. (quoting Graff, supra note 190).
197. Id. at 29.
198. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
Mex.-U.S, art. 9, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (“Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver
up its own nationals, but the executive authority . . . shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party,
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.”).
199. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 29.
200. Id. at 4. The victim, José Antonio Elena Rodriguez, was shot ten times in the back while
walking home along the Mexican side of the border fence. Taylor Dolven, Over the Line, VICE
NEWS (June 9, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/what-happens-when-u-s-border-patrol-kills-in-
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prosecution make it highly unlikely this will become a trend. In addition,
from 2009 to 2012, ninety-seven percent of complaints reporting abuse by
agents resulted in “No Action Taken.”201
The present conditions illustrate the need for an immediate means of
accountability, redress, and deterrence.202 The need for a judicial remedy203
becomes amplified when considering the vast number of people subjected to
the authority of Border Patrol.204 The border area where the shooting in the
instant case occurred runs though Paso del Norte, which is “a single metropolitan” consisting of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico.205 Five hundred thousand Mexicans and Americans cross every day for
work, school, family, shopping, doctor visits, and other regular activities.206
These binational characteristics are not limited to the community surrounding
Paso del Norte but instead are commonly shared by the communities that run
up and down the southwestern border, which have also had their share of
cross-border shootings resembling the facts surrounding the death of Hernández (i.e., a non-threatening encounter where the agents claimed rocks were
being thrown).207 Accordingly, the Court’s decision to avoid providing an
mexico. The trial was set to be heard on October 24, 2017. Judge Delays Trial of Border Patrol
Agent in Fatal Shooting, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/arizona/articles/2017-08-11/judge-delays-trial-of-border-patrol-agent-in-fatal-shooting. The trial,
however, was delayed to March 2018. Rafael Carranza, Family of Teen Killed by Border Patrol
Agent Denounces Trial Delays, AZCENTRAL (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/border-issues/2017/10/11/family-jose-antonio-elena-rodriguez-killedborder-patrol-agent-lonnie-swartz-decries-trial-delays/748092001/.
201. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 28.
202. While recognizing the argument in favor of leaving the means and method of accountability, redress, and deterrence in the hands of Congress, the Court has taken the position “that individuals need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.” Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who come to
them to vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a
right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and
even if the legislature refuses to act.”). On remand, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the only possible
grounds for recovery stem from a judicial remedy created under Bivens. Hernandez v. Mesa, No.
12-50217, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (“No federal statute authorizes a damages action by
a foreign citizen injured on foreign soil by a federal law enforcement officer under these circumstances. Thus, plaintiff’s recovery for damages is possible only if the federal courts approve a
Bivens implied cause of action.”).
203. The Court has recognized deterrence through judicial accountability in other instances. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (recognizing “that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is
to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectiviely available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it’” (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960))).
204. See supra note 175.
205. Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 2.
206. Id. at 2, 6.
207. Id. at 4; see Steven D. Schwinn, Can the Parents of a Mexican Youth Sue a U.S. Border
Officer in Federal Court for Fourth and Fifth Amendment Violations After the Officer Shot and
Killed the Youth While the Officer Was on the U.S. Side of the Border, but the Youth Was on the
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immediate remedy will have far reaching effects on both American and Mexican nationals.208
B. Finding a Solution Through Boumediene
As described in Part II,209 there are two modern approaches to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution—the significant voluntary connections test established in United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez210 and the objective factor analysis applied in Boumediene v. Bush.211 While these positions
seem directly at odds with each other, as one incorporates the functional approach and the other adopts the formalist interpretation, the Court failed to
proclaim which is the commanding inquiry and avoided applying either to
determine the Fourth Amendment’s extraterritorial reach.212 This Section
will argue that Boumediene should have controlled,213 and then it will apply
the Boumediene objective factor test to conclude the Fourth Amendment extends extraterritorially under the facts of the instant case.214 Its extraterritorial reach will provide the basis of a civil cause of action that will serve as a
remedy for Hernández’s family and a deterrence for Border Patrol Agents
from continuing the use of excessive force.215
1. Boumediene Controls
Instead of declining to address the issue in its entirety, the Court should
have applied the functionalist analysis established in Boumediene to determine the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment over the formalist approach established earlier in Verdugo–Urquidez for two reasons.
First, Boumediene essentially overrules the significant voluntary connections
test used in Verdugo–Urquidez to apply the Fourth Amendment extraterritorially because its strict territorial approach is at odds with the more recent

Mexican Side?, 44 PREVIEW OF U.S. S. CT. CASES 145, 145–46 (2017) (explaining how a cellphone
video disproves the Government’s position that Hernández was throwing rocks at Agent Mesa); see,
e.g., Dolven, supra note 200 (telling the stories of individuals killed by Border Patrol agents); AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF N.M., supra note 173 (providing the facts of fatal encounters with Border
Patrol agents from 2010 to 2016).
208. Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 4.
209. See supra Section II.C.
210. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
211. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
212. See Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining how
courts have attempted to reconcile Verdugo–Urquidez with the newer functionalist precedent established in Boumediene in the absence of direction from the Court), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117 (5th
Cir. 2015).
213. See infra Section IV.B.1.
214. See infra Section IV.B.2.
215. Id.
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decision’s functional objective factor analysis.216 As the Fifth Circuit’s panel
opinion recognized, “[T]he Boumediene Court appear[ed] to repudiate the
formalistic reasoning of Verdugo–Urquidez[].”217
Second, even if Verdugo–Urquidez is still good law, its significant voluntary connections test is minimally persuasive because it was decided by
plurality and has been recognized as dicta by lower courts.218 In addition, the
facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those in Verdugo–Urquidez,
as that case involved a warrantless search of property,219 while the instant
case revolves around the use of unreasonable lethal force, triggering the prohibition of excessive force proscribed by the Fourth Amendment.220 Therefore, in either circumstance, the Court should have relied on the Boumediene
analysis.
2. Applying Boumediene
By using the Boumediene analysis, the Court should have concluded the
Fourth Amendment applied extraterritorially. The Boumediene Court provided three objective factors for consideration: “(1) the citizenship and status
of the [victim] and the adequacy of the process through which that status
determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where [the incident] took

216. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764 (holding that the “questions of extraterritoriality turn on
objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism”).
217. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 265; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 272 (2009) (explaining how “Boumediene provides a long overdue repudiation of Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo–Urquidez”).
218. D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and
the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 90 (2011) (noting, “[m]any courts . . . [have] characterize[ed] the ‘substantial connections’ test as mere dictum in a divided opinion”); see, e.g., United
States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (emphasizing that “a majority of the
justices did not subscribe to Chief Rehnquist’s opinion” before declining to follow the rule established in Verdugo–Urquidez), rev’d on other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D. Colo. 1992) (recognizing, before rejecting its application to the
case at hand, that the holding in Verdugo–Urquidez was “not joined by the majority of the justices”),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993). But see Gaylor v. United States, 74.
F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (announcing that “this court considers itself bound by Supreme Court
dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and
not enfeebled by later statements”).
219. United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990) (“The question presented
by this case is whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.” (emphasis
added)).
220. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004, (2017) (stating that the second question presented asked: “Whether the shooting violated the victim’s Fourth Amendment rights” (emphasis
added)).
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place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the [victim’s] entitlement to” Fourth Amendment protections.221 The following subsections
will apply each factor in turn.
a. Citizenship & Status of Hernández
It is undisputed that Hernández is not a United States citizen.222
Boumediene, however, makes clear that citizenship is “not dispositive” by
providing constitutional protection to “a limited ‘class of noncitizens.’”223
By extending the Constitutional protections to Hernández, a similar limited
class of noncitizens would be established, those that live their daily lives on
and around the border. Furthermore, the citizenship of Hernández was unknown to Agent Mesa at the time of the shooting.224 This exemplifies the
need to create such a class of protected noncitizens, or at least requires a restricted emphasis placed on this factor when used in the border context, because it is nearly impossible to determine the citizenship of individuals crossing the border before excessive force is employed due to the daily
intermingling of both American and Mexican citizens.225 Lastly, Hernández’s status as “a civilian killed outside an occupied zone or theater of war”
weighs in his favor.226
b. Nature of the Culvert & Surrounding Border Area
In considering the nature of the site where the incident occurred, the
Boumediene court emphasized that de jure sovereignty is not the “only relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution.”227 Instead, the analysis focuses on the control exerted by the United
States over the particular area and whether the United States “intend[s] to
govern indefinitely.”228 Border patrol agents work within feet of the border

221. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
222. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 268 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015).
223. Id. (applying the citizenship prong of the Boumediene analysis). The class created in
Boumediene were the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Id.; Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732.
224. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225. See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text.
226. See Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 268–69 (distinguishing Hernández’s status from the ‘“enemy
aliens’ detained during the Allied Powers’ post-World War II occupation in Eisentrager” and the
‘enemy combatants’ held pursuant to the Authorization of Use of Military Force in Boumediene”
within the context of the War on Terror (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66
(1950)); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734, 767).
227. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
228. Id. at 768–69.
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every day, maintaining a “heavy presence” over the entire border area.229
Specifically, agents frequently “exercise hard power across the border,” such
as aggressive or coercive tactics, and regularly do their job over the line by
conducting “preinspection[s]” before allowing individuals or vehicles to
cross into the United States.230 As explained by the Chief of United States
Border Patrol, “U.S. border security policy ‘extends [the nation’s] zone of
security outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last line
of defense, but one of many.’”231
The control exerted by United States’ officials is not a recent development, as the United States has historically had a “constant presence on both
sides of the line.”232 Like the Boumediene Court’s description of Guantanamo Bay, the United States’ presence and control over the southwest border can be similarly characterized as not “transient” since “[i]n every practical sense [the border] . . . is within the constant jurisdiction of the United
States.”233 As the Fifth Circuit concluded, “[E]ven though the United States
has no formal control or de facto sovereignty over the Mexican side of the
border, the heavy presence and regular activity of federal agents across a permanent border without any . . . accountability weigh in favor of recognizing
some constitutional reach.”234 Nonetheless, Agent Mesa was, in fact, within
the territory of the United States when the act was committed, indicating his
conduct was entirely controlled by the authority of the United States.235
While not explicitly required by the Boumediene Court, a court should
consider the features of the culvert and the surrounding community when
determining the nature of the site where the incident took place to provide a
complete picture of the area under examination. The surrounding area represents a binational community, consisting of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad
Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico, that cannot simply be divided by an invisible
line.236 A recent poll found there is a “sense of community and dependency
229. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269–70; see U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., BORDER PATROL
STRATEGIC PLAN 18 (2012–2016), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/bp_strategic_plan.pdf (explaining the objective to expand the enforcement presence on and around the Southwest border).
230. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269, 270 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(b) (1997)).
231. Id. at 270 (quoting Securing Our Borders—Operational Control and the Path Forward:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th
Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of Michael J. Fisher, Chief of United States Border Patrol)) (alterations
omitted).
232. Eva L. Britran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign Nationals
on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 244–46 (2014) (“Since the mid-nineteenth century, the United States has wielded military, political, and economic authority over northern Mexico.”).
233. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69.
234. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 270.
235. Id. at 269.
236. Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 2, 14.
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between [these] sister cities across the border.”237 The interconnectedness of
the two cities and their lack of awareness of the artificial border claiming to
separate them can be demonstrated in a variety of ways: eligible Mexican
students who attend University of Texas at El Paso pay in-state tuition;238
there are regular joint cultural celebrations and activities, such as the Run
International United States-Mexico 10K239 and the blended El Dia de los
Muertos celebrations;240 and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico switched to
daylight savings because children began showing up an hour early for
school.241 Furthermore, there are a number of cross-border institutions that
work together to solve collective problems.242 Specifically, and most noteworthy, the culvert was built and is now maintained by a joint United StatesMexico boundary commission.243 The commission contains “representatives
of both nations” and exercises control of the border area of the culvert.244
Relatedly, as Justice Breyer explained, this portion of the culvert is a “limitrophe” area,245 which is subjected to “co-operation and good neighborliness.”246 Additionally, as Justice Breyer also illustrated, the actual borderline
is ambiguous, as “[i]t does not itself contain any physical features of a border.”247 Instead, fences lie on either side of the culvert delineating the two
countries.248 As Border Patrol itself has recognized,249 it is impossible to
identify where the actual borderline is situated.250 When considering the im-

237. Alfredo Corchado, Common Ground, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (July 18, 2016), http://interactives.dallasnews.com/2016/border-poll/.
238. Brief by Border Scholars, supra note 175, at 11–12.
239. Id. at 12. The run “begins in El Paso, crosses the Stanton Street Bridge into downtown
Juárez, and then turns back to a finish line at the summit of the Paso del Norte Bridge (the bridge
beside which Sergio Hernández was killed).” Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 13.
242. See, e.g., id. at 18–20 (describing the United States-Mexico Border Governors Conference,
the United States-Mexico Border Legislative Conference, and the collaboration between emergency
services).
243. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2009 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2010.
245. See supra note 163 (defining “limitrophe”); see also Jennifer Pitt, Dredging for Diplomacy? Colorado River Management at the United States-Mexico Border, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 47, 47 (2006) (explaining that limitrophe is “a unique nomenclature that
means ‘at the border’ in both English and Spanish”).
246. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2010 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2009.
248. Id.
249. See Border Patrol Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT.
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview#wcm-survey-target-id (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) (describing the borderline as “barely discernible”).
250. See Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2009, 2010–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the nature
of the actual borderline).
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moderate amount of control the United States exerts over this closely intertwined area, in which the borderline has become a fruitless feature, it seems
this is precisely the type of zone that deserves constitutional protection—an
area where it is impossible to determine where the Constitution stops and
where it begins.
c.

Practical Obstacles to Affording Hernández Fourth
Amendment Protections

To determine whether there are practical obstacles involved in extending constitutional protections, the Court considers a broad range of potential
barriers relevant to the constitutional provision at issue.251 Those discussed
in this Subsection include the possibility of (1) additional expenditures and
undue burdens, (2) conflicts with other nations, and (3) adverse consequences
that may emerge in future contexts. This Subsection will also explore the
practical effects involved in failing to extend Fourth Amendment protections
in the context of this case.
First, extending Fourth Amendment protections would not “require expenditure of funds by the Government and [would not] divert the attention of
[Border Patrol] personnel from other pressing tasks.”252 The right would
merely provide a means of recourse and a method of deterrence, simply by
making Border Patrol agents think carefully before using their weapons in
unreasonable circumstances.253 Nonetheless, even if some costs and diversions did arise, they would require no more than an “incremental expenditure
of resources.”254 Relatedly, extending a remedy through the Fourth Amendment would not hinder Border Patrol agents’ ability to do their job because
they would still be permitted to use force under reasonable circumstances and
deadly force when necessary—a standard they should already be applying.255
No additional burden, therefore, would be placed on the agents.
251. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769–70.
252. Id. at 769. The Boumediene court in fact recognized that extending the habeas corpus
privileges to detainees “may require expenditure of funds by the Government and may divert the
attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks” but nonetheless granted detainees this
right by explaining that this consideration is not “dispositive.” Id.
253. Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 30 (“[T]he prospect of civil liability
plays a proper and important role in deterring Border Patrol officers from using excessive force in
confrontations with individuals at and across the border.”).
254. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769.
255. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., USE OF FORCE POLICY, GUIDELINES AND
PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 1, 3 (2014), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/UseofForcePolicyHandbook.pdf (proscribing that agents may use “‘objectively reasonable’ force only
when it is necessary to carry out their law enforcement duties” and that they may use deadly force
“only when necessary, that is, when the officer/agent has a reasonable belief that the subject of such
force poses an imminent danger of serious physical injury or death to the officer/agent or to another
person”).
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Second, extending Fourth Amendment protections would not “cause
friction” with Mexico.256 In fact, as set out in the Amicus Brief filed in support of Hernández by Mexico, “[A]pplying U.S. law in this case would not
interfere with operations of the Mexican government within Mexico . . . [but
would instead] show appropriate respect for Mexico’s sovereignty on its own
territory and for the rights of its nationals.”257 Mexico further explained that
applying the Constitution in this case would not infringe upon Mexico’s sovereignty.258 Notably, Mexico clarified, “Any invasion of Mexico’s sovereignty occurred when Agent Mesa shot his gun across the border at Sergio
Hernández—not when the boy’s parents sought to hold Agent Mesa responsible for his actions.”259 Similarly, there are reciprocity implications involved, as the United States would expect Mexico to hold its agents accountable if similar situations occurred in reverse.260
Third, the concerns surrounding Border Patrol’s, and other United States
agencies’, increased use of “sophisticated systems of surveillance” and the
implications that may result if the Fourth Amendment is extended into the
border zone are unfounded.261 The right could be narrowly construed to apply where it is needed the most—in the immediate border vicinity. Additionally, the facts of the instant case limit its holding only to those subjected to
excessive deadly force by Border Patrol agents and not to circumstances of
warrantless searches that may result from the use of advanced surveillance
technology.262 Therefore, the right would not reach those outside this limited
class of non-citizens—those within close proximity to the border and a victim
of a Border Patrol agent’s excessive use of force.263

256. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
257. Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 4, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118) [hereinafter Brief by
Mexico].
258. Id. at 7.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 3 (“The United States would expect no less if the situation were reversed and a
Mexican government agent, standing in Mexico and shooting across the border, had killed a U.S.
national standing on U.S. soil.”).
261. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 267 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining “[t]hese sophisticated systems of surveillance might carry with them a host of implications for the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . [as they could] ‘disrupt the ability of the political branches to respond to foreign situations involving our national interest’ and could also plunge Border Patrol agents ‘into a sea of
uncertainty as to what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad”
(first citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); and then quoting United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1990), reh’g granted, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015))).
262. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches
of the persons and effects of [those at the border] are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”).
263. See also Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 12-50217, slip op. at 26 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (Prado,
J., dissenting) (noting “Hernandez’s parents do not seek to hold any high-level officials liable for
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By not extending Fourth Amendment protections in this case, a number
of practical concerns emerge. Failing “to apply the Fourth Amendment to
the culvert,” Justice Breyer explained, “would produce serious anomalies.”264
The actions of Agent Mesa remain the same no matter what side of the indiscernible borderline he was on—the “lethal impact” does not vary.265 Considering the vast number of people who cross the border every day, the anomalous effects are only likely to multiply.266 As Justice Breyer reasoned, “It
does not make much sense to distinguish for Fourth Amendment purposes
among these many thousands of individuals on the basis of an invisible line
of which none of them is aware.”267 Through the application of the
Boumediene factor analysis, the Court should have concluded the Fourth
Amendment reached Hernández and, accordingly, extends to those who may
find themselves in similar circumstances.
C. Fourth Amendment Historical Considerations
Providing a remedy in this instance is not at odds with the Fourth
Amendment, as Verdugo–Urquidez would suggest, but is actually consistent
with the Amendment’s historical purpose. As used by the Fifth Circuit to
deny Hernández Fourth Amendment protections,268 the Verdugo–Urquidez
approach focuses on the Fourth Amendment’s use of the phrase “the people”
and concludes it only refers to citizens of the United States.269 Under this
approach, noncitizens, at least those without significant voluntary connections, cannot invoke the Fourth Amendment because its protections do not
reach those outside of “the people.”270
When the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment, however, their fundamental aim was to curb unfettered power exercised by the government.271
More precisely, the “founders sought to guarantee a general right of security . . . through the enforcement of policies and procedures capable of constraining government agents and limiting the discretionary authority of those
the acts of their subordinates . . . [but] are suing an individual federal agent for his own actions”
(emphasis added)).
264. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2010 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. Brief by Mexico, supra note 257, at 8.
266. Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2010 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 2011.
268. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 266 (5th Cir. 2014).
269. Id. at 263.
270. See id. at 263 (explaining this textual approach).
271. DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 154 (2017)
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment was motivated by founding-era struggles with abuses of power.”); see
id. at 69–70 (explaining how the Fourth Amendment specifically arose as a response to “experiences
in England and the colonies with general warrants and writs of assistance,” which “provided executive agents with what amounted to unlimited licenses to conduct searches and seizures without fear
of being held accountable for their conduct”).
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wielding the truncheon of state power.”272 Granting Hernández’s family the
ability to bring their suit under the Fourth Amendment would, accordingly,
create a means of deterrence to dissuade Border Patrol agents from abusing
the power bestowed upon them.273 In other words, it would create a “procedure[] capable of constraining government agents.”274 The protection of the
“state of security and tranquility” the Fourth Amendment attempts to preserve is, therefore, furthered by limiting the insecurity that a Border Patrol
agent may take the life of another under unreasonable circumstances with
immunity.275
Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment right at question here is not an individual right, but it is a collective right held by “those who compose a community.”276 Hernández, while disqualified from “the people,” is nonetheless
a representative of the collective subject to Border Patrol’s authority. Holding Agent Mesa liable for his actions against Hernández, therefore, protects
this community as a whole and serves to impose restraints on the overreaching authority the Fourth Amendment prohibits.
As these historical considerations have illuminated, the central question
revolves around the conduct of the government actor and less on the status of
the victim. Agent Mesa’s use of excessive deadly force in this case is, accordingly, in direct conflict with the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment—irrespective of Hernandez’s nationality. Providing a remedy in this
instance aligns precisely with the Framers’ intentions when drafting the
Fourth Amendment.277

272. Id. at 169.
273. See Brief by Former Officials of CBP, supra note 174, at 3 (arguing that the “because of
the conditions within the Border Patrol, similar incidents will likely continue to occur if agents
cannot be held accountable in civil suits”).
274. GRAY, supra note 271, at 169.
275. Id. at 157.
276. Id. at 147–48 (describing that the inclusion of “the” before “people” signifies that it refers
to a right of collective protection).
277. See supra note 271–272 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Hernandez v. Mesa,278 the Court declined to address whether the
Fourth Amendment extended steps across the border to protect Hernández
from Agent Mesa’s deadly use of force.279 Agent Mesa’s actions were not an
anomaly but were instead an example of a much larger problem—the chronic
use of excessive force by Border Patrol agents and the lack of recourse available to victims.280 Presented with an opportunity through the instant case, the
Court should have provided a mechanism of deterrence and redress by establishing the basis for a civil remedy.281 By applying the functionalist approach
established in Boumediene, the Court had the means to reach the conclusion
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the limited class of non-citizens subjected to Border Patrol’s authority.282 This conclusion reflects the Framer’s
intended purpose of the Fourth Amendment—to prevent government officials from abusing the discretionary power that thwarts the ability of the people to feel secure.283 To curb the excessive force used at the border and to
prevent others from meeting the same harrowing end as Hernández, the Constitution must extend as far as the bullet can travel.

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
Hernandez, 136 S. Ct. at 2008.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.

